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LEGACIES OF A PANDEMIC: REMOTE ATTESTATION
AND ELECTRONIC WILLS
Richard F. Storrow ‡

The
coronavirus
pandemic
has
compelled governors and legislatures to
fast-track remote attestation laws, a
previously prohibited form of witnessing
that has largely been left out of the
thoughtful, nearly two-decades-long but
largely unsuccessful, effort to validate
electronic wills. This Article examines the
unforeseen problems that have arisen in
the rush to institute remote attestation in
the current crisis, urges lawmakers to
interpret the presence requirement as
encompassing remote attestation, and
predicts that the current experiment with
remote attestation will speed the
enactment of electronic-will legislation.
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INTRODUCTION

With COVID-19 and its variants now a leading cause of death in the
United States and around the world, 1 many feel a new urgency to finalize
their estate plans. 2 At the same time, health officials, in their effort to curb
the rate of infection with the virus that causes COVID-19, discourage
congregating in poorly ventilated indoor spaces. 3 This guidance makes
everyday transactions more difficult to complete. Marriage ceremonies, 4
closing ceremonies, 5 and notarizations 6 can feel out of reach. Certainly, will
execution ceremonies are now more difficult to conduct. 7 The threat posed
by the pandemic and the necessary response to it have made people more
eager to finalize their estate plans and simultaneously made achieving that
goal elusive at best. 8
The inability of attorneys to help testators execute their wills in the
traditional manner—around a conference table in an office with the help of
pre-arranged witnesses—has driven some eager individuals to resort to do-ityourself will execution ceremonies while masked and observing social
distancing guidelines. These ceremonies are conducted with an attorney’s
written guidance or by following the instructions found on a website or
Steven H. Woolf, Derek A. Chapman & John Hyung Lee, COVID-19 as the Leading
Cause of Death in the United States, 325 JAMA 123 (2021); Covid-19 Has Become One of
the Biggest Killers of 2020, THE ECONOMIST, https://www.economist.com/graphic-

1

detail/2020/05/01/covid-19-has-become-one-of-the-biggest-killers-of-2020
[https://perma.cc/9TFW-UZBY]; Sabrina Tavernise & Abby Goodnough, A Grim Measure
of Covid’s Toll: Life Expectancy Drops Sharply in U.S., N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/18/us/covid-life-expectancy.html
[https://perma.cc/Q4ME-BQN2].
Benjamin Mueller, Where There’s a Will in England, There’s a Way, N.Y. TIMES (May 4,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/28/world/europe/will-writing-coronavirus.html
[https://perma.cc/YST7-XQU3].
How to Protect Yourself and Others, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION
(Feb.
25,
2022),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-gettingsick/prevention.html [https://perma.cc/8QKX-5F8L].
See, e.g., PROCEDURES FOR VIRTUAL MARRIAGE CEREMONIES CONDUCTED BY NON-CITY
CLERK’S OFFICE MARRIAGE OFFICIANTS, OFF. OF THE CITY CLERK OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK,
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5f2954720ae34d61da944f39/t/5f5908ea7a5fea1b72f3
10e6/1599670563910/Celebrant+Procedures+for+Covid+Virtual+Weddings
[https://perma.cc/4PQQ-N9EX].
Ga. Exec. Order No. 03.31.20.01 (Mar. 31, 2020) (authorizing the use of real-time audiovisual communication technology to assist in notarizing real estate documents).
REVISED UNIF. LAW ON NOTARIAL ACTS (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2021).
Leanne Fryer Broyles & Randy Fisher, Estate Planning in Times of Social Distancing, 47
EST. PLAN. 9 (2020); David Horton & Reis Kress Weisbord, COVID-19 and Formal Wills,
73 STAN. L. REV. 18 (2020).
Mueller, supra note 2.
2

3

4

5

6
7

8
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contained in a kit purchased at a neighborhood drugstore. 9 Others are
putting off estate planning for another day. The problems inherent in either
approach are well known to estate planners. 10 Just as putting off medical care
can be disastrous, 11 postponed or botched estate planning can have negative
consequences. These consequences can range from one’s assets being
distributed to unintended beneficiaries to lost opportunities to name a
guardian for one’s children or a decision maker in the event of one’s own
incapacity. Recognizing the dilemma, on September 4, 2020, the British
Lord Chancellor issued an executive order temporarily amending the Wills
Act by defining the presence of witnesses to include “presence by means of
videoconference or other visual transmission.” 12 The amendment applies to
wills executed between January 31, 2020, and January 31, 2022. 13 The
executive order is similar to the many legislative enactments and executive
orders across the United States that have created temporary exceptions to
will execution rules as a way of lessening the impact of the coronavirus’s
disruption of everyday life. 14
The widespread and keen interest in remote attestation comes at a time
when the most prominent proposal for the reform of will-execution law has,
for many years, been to permit the use of electronic wills (i.e., wills created
and stored in digital form and signed electronically). In contrast to the rapid
embrace of digitally-executed business transactions in the past two decades, 15
the move toward electronic wills has been sluggish. Only a few courts and
legislatures have considered electronic wills, and unlike digital contracts and
other documents that proliferate in the business realm, electronic wills are
currently permitted in only a handful of states. 16 Before the pandemic, even
9

Id.

Gerard G. Brew, Revised Commentary of ABA Taskforce on Do-It-Yourself Estate
Planning, 30 PROB. & PROP. (Nov. & Dec. 2016) (describing the potential pitfalls of do-it-

10

yourself estate planning).
Saqib Masroor, Collateral Damage of COVID-19 Pandemic: Delayed Medical Care, 35 J.
CARD. SURG. 1345 (2020) (examining how delays “in seeking care can lead to increased
morbidity and mortality”).
The Wills Act 1837 (Electronic Communications) (Amendment) (Coronavirus) Order
2020,
2020
No.
952
art.
2
(UK),
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2020/952/introduction/made [https://perma.cc/B65FP3TL].
11

12

13
14

Id.
Emergency Remote Notarization and Remote Witnessing Orders, AM. COLL. OF TR. &

EST. COUNS. (Dec. 23, 2020), https://actec.org/resources/emergency-remote-notarizationand-witnessing-orders [https://perma.cc/ZY9F-FE67].
Tony Bradley, 2019 Has Been a Very Good Year for Ironclad and Digital Contracting,
FORBES (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tonybradley/2019/12/10/2029-hasbeen-a-very-good-year-for-ironclad-and-digital-contracting/?sh=
7331befe61c8
[https://perma.cc/6G4T-TD3D].
Before the pandemic, courts in three states had admitted electronic wills to probate,
namely, Tennessee, Ohio, and Michigan. See Taylor v. Holt, 134 S.W.3d 830 (Tenn. Ct.
15

16
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in those progressive states, remote attestation was largely out of the question.
Purveyors of “online wills” have appeared on the scene to offer a digital
approach to estate planning, but in the prevailing regulatory environment,
their services reduce to little more than ink and paper wills. Shortly before
the pandemic, the Uniform Laws Commission ("Commission”)
promulgated the Uniform Electronic Wills Act (“UEWA”). 17 Carefully and
thoughtfully drafted, the UEWA appears to be gaining momentum, but for
reasons and under conditions its drafters could not have anticipated. In
short, it has been the exigencies of the pandemic that have sped the entry of
the digital ethos of the marketplace into the estate planning sphere.
Now that many states have so rapidly embraced remote attestation,
albeit on an emergency basis, there has been a seismic shift in estate
planning practice. Estate planners now find themselves experimenting with
methods of electronic witnessing in an environment still largely unreceptive
to digital wills. This odd and unexpected change of course presents both the
difficulties and the opportunities that are the subject of this Article.
This Article first takes a close look at how remote attestation has been
largely left out of the nearly two-decades-long discussion of electronic wills
and examines the problems and possibilities that have arisen in the rush to
institute it in the current crisis. In a review of the current situation, this
Article focuses in particular on the problem of interjurisdictional will
execution posed by remote attestation and how that problem should be
addressed under prevailing choice-of-law norms. This Article also makes
two normative and predictive claims. First, although the presence
requirement in current legislation was not crafted with remote attestation in
mind, judicial decisions that purport to narrow the legally permissible scope
of presence to a “single-room” or “through-a-window" standard are
unjustifiably restrictive. The purpose of the requirement is ill-served by a
physically restrictive conception of what qualifies as presence and wellserved by the safeguards of remote attestation. There is thus good reason to
App. 2003); In re Estate of Castro, No. 2013ES00140 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. June 19, 2013);
In re Estate of Horton, 925 N.W.2d 207 (Mich. Ct. App. 2018). The Tennessee court ruled
that the electronic will before it complied with the will-execution statute. Taylor, 134 S.W.3d
at 834. The Ohio and Michigan decisions relied instead on the harmless error rule. In re
Estate of Castro, No. 2013ES00140; Horton, 925 N.W.2d at 214. Arizona, Florida, Illinois,
Indiana, Maryland and Nevada recognize electronic wills by statute. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-2518 (2019); FLA. STAT. § 732.522 (2021); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 6/1-1; IND. CODE §
29-1-21-1 (2021); MD. CODE, ESTATES AND TRUSTS LAW § 4-102(b)(3)(ii), (c)-(e) (2020);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 133.085 (2017). In addition, Colorado, North Dakota, Utah, and
Washington have enacted the Uniform Electronic Wills Act. See ELEC. WILLS ACT (UNIF.
L.
COMM’N
Draft
Jan.
22,
2019),
https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?Docume
ntFileKey=506a61da-e7cc-9b69-0fe1-8df8df6bf431
[https://perma.cc/H3HC-WTFS].
Georgia, Massachusetts, the District of Columbia, and the United States Virgin Islands are
currently considering enacting the Uniform Electronic Wills Act. Id.
UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT (2019).
17
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advocate for the inclusion of remote attestation within the definition of
presence in the absence of express legislative provisions to exclude it.
Second, although remote attestation may seem to some as too radical
a proposal that could delay the advent of electronic wills, this Article will
instead be the currently widespread use of remote attestation across the
country that will ultimately speed the enactment of electronic-will
provisions. This Article supports these propositions with a searching
exploration of the presence requirement and with the results of experiments
in remote attestation conducted by approximately eighty participants in the
summer and fall of 2021.
II.

WILLS FOR A DIGITAL AGE

A properly executed will is “the best evidence of the intent of the
sound-minded, freely acting testator.” 18 Thinking about how this ideal might
be met in the digital age has preoccupied scholars for decades. Individuals
can conduct so much of their business online today, but surprisingly, there
is no readily available online or digital manner of executing a will. A
common refrain is that wills law is “behind the times” and could do more
to “catch up” with technology. 19 Strict judicial interpretation of old legislation
is the primary driver of wills law’s reputation as hidebound. It is not the
purpose of this Article to explore the reasons for this legal lethargy except
to point out that there is both judicial and legislative hesitation to expand
what counts as due execution. The judicial hesitation stems from a fear that
fraud may more readily creep into the proceedings if courts relax their
interpretation of will-execution requirements. 20 At the legislative level, there
is very little public momentum behind devoting resources to updating an
area of the law that appears to be performing more or less adequately.
The problem with digitizing the creation and storage of wills is not that
there is a requirement that a will be memorialized with pen and paper.
Nonetheless, the leap from physical wills to electronic wills is a difficult one
to make. Part of the difficulty is that the idea of an electronic will suffers
from imprecision. The Uniform Electronic Wills Act defines an electronic
will as a will “executed electronically,” 21 meaning with “technology having
electrical, digital, magnetic, wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or similar

Turano, McKinney Practice Commentary, N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-2.1
(2021).
Kyle B. Gee, The “Electronic Wills” Revolution: An Overview of Nevada’s New Statute,
The Uniform Law Commission’s Work, and Other Recent Developments, 28 OHIO PROB.
L.J. 126, 127 (2018) (urging a broad conception of the movement as one seeking to
modernize the law of wills) [hereinafter Gee, “Electronic Wills” Revolution]; Developments
in the Law—More Data, More Problems, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1715, 1716 (2018).
See In re Proley’s Estate, 422 A.2d 136, 138–39 (Pa. 1980); In re Pavlinko’s Estate, 148
A.2d 528, 530 (Pa. 1959) (citing In re Bryen’s Estate, 195 A. 17, 20 (Pa. 1937)).
UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT § 2(3) (2019).
18

19

20

21
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capabilities.” 22 A conceptualization more in keeping with an electronic will
that can be given effect is that an electronic will is a will recorded in an
electronic format, executed electronically, and access to which requires a
device powered by electricity. 23 It is best exemplified by creating and
executing a will with the aid of word processing software and saving it to the
hard drive of a computer. If a will is printed out and executed with a pen,
the will is no longer considered electronic. 24 The essentials of an electronic
will, then, are the underlying electronic writing, the electronic signatures
embodied in it, and its safekeeping in electronic storage. For this reason,
online wills are by and large not electronic wills, since online wills
contemplate the testator’s plugging information into the fields of an online
form, the generation of an unexecuted will, its reproduction of the electronic
document on paper, and its execution and attestation in the usual fashion.
Online wills are best described as do-it-yourself wills subject to the same
potential defects of any will that is executed outside the supervision of an
attorney. 25
Despite courts’ early rejections of videotaped and tape-recorded wills
as lacking the character of a “writing,” 26 the statutes describing will execution
do not in and of themselves preclude electronic writings from serving as
wills. Current enactments require that wills be, at a minimum, “in writing”
and “signed,” requirements Professor James Lindgren has dubbed the
“print paradigm.” 27 But because the “signature” and “writing” requirements
do not mean that a will’s validity depends upon the use of pen and paper, 28
the early decisions found electronic wills to be in alignment with existing
provisions. 29 States in favor of electronic wills may thus not feel any urgency
UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT § 2(1) (2019).
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 732.521; 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 6/1-20; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
133.085.
UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT pref. n. (2019) (describing the act’s concern as wills executed
electronically rather than on “something tangible (usually paper)”).
Will execution ceremonies conducted by testators using instructions written by their
attorneys are not a best practice. See In re Estate of Falk, 47 A.D.3d 21, 28 (N.Y. App. Div.
2007); In re Estate of Rimerman, 139 Misc. 2d 506, 509 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988).
See, e.g., In re Estate of Reed, 672 P.2d 829, 833 (Wyo. 1983) (tape-recorded will) (“The
use of a tape recording or other type of voice print as a testamentary instrument is a decision
for the legislature to make. We will not enlarge, stretch, expand or extend the holographic
will statute to include a testamentary device not falling within the express provisions of the
statute.”); see also UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502 cmt. a (2019). Videotapes of the will execution
ceremony may be used as evidence of the genuineness of the will, however. See, e.g., IND.
CODE § 29-1-5-3.2. A videotape of a will execution ceremony could be useful evidence in
defending against a claim that a will was not properly executed or was the product of
testamentary incapacity or undue influence; Gerry Beyer & William R. Buckley, Videotape
and the Probate Process: The Nexus Grows, 42 OKLA. L. REV. 43, 48–49, 74 (1989).
James Lindgren, The Fall of Formalism, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1009, 1021 (1992).
JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 273-74 (8th ed.
2009) (listing a tractor fender, undergarments, a chest of drawers, a wall, etc.).
See, e.g., Taylor v. Holt, 134 S.W.3d 830, 833 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).
22
23

24

25

26

27
28

29
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to make explicit provision for them in their wills acts. Other courts have
admitted electronic wills to probate based on the harmless error doctrine, 30
which excuses mistakes in the execution of wills and is discussed in more
detail below in connection with the presence requirement. 31 In addition, a
few states have amended their statutes to make explicit their inclusion of
electronic wills. 32
A more difficult leap to make in the age of digitization is in introducing
any element of remoteness into the will-execution equation. The risk is that
remoteness would undermine the belief that the witnessing feature of a will’s
execution requires the physical presence of the testator with the witnesses.
Holographic wills, wholly in the testator’s handwriting and signed by the
testator, 33 are obviously one solution in that they do not require witnesses,
but only a bit more than half of the states allow them. 34 Moreover, their
informality and indelible association with litigation about testamentary intent
make holographic wills undesirable in matters of estate planning. 35 The
Uniform Probate Code’s signature harmless-error rule might be useful for
excusing the lack of witnesses, but it is available in even fewer states than are
holographic wills, some twelve as of this writing, 36 one having enacted it in
response to the coronavirus pandemic. 37
The direction in the uniform laws realm has been toward promoting
electronic wills and, albeit less enthusiastically, remote attestation. As
mentioned above, in 2019 the Commission promulgated the UEWA,
emphasizing electronic documents and signatures. 38 The comments to the
UEWA reveal that the drafters did not consider the execution of wills via
Zoom, WebEx, or other providers of virtual meeting spaces to be a viable

In re Estate of Castro, No. 2013ES00140 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. June 19, 2013), for example,
relies on the harmless error doctrine suggesting that the electronic execution was not in
conformity with the rules of due execution but could be excused as harmless given the clear
and convincing evidence that the testator intended the document to be his will. Kyle B. Gee,

30

Beyond Castro’s Tablet Will: Electronic Wills Around the World and Re-Visiting Ohio’s
Harmless Error Statute, 26 OHIO PROB. L.J. 149, 151 (2016).
See infra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 16.
31
32

NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2328.
JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JAMES LINDGREN, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND
ESTATES 269 (8th ed. 2009) (listing twenty-seven states).
Edward A. Haman, Holographic Will: Is a Handwritten Will Valid?, LEGALZOOM (June
28, 2021), http://www.legalzoom.com/articles/holographic-will-is-a-handwritten-will-valid
[https://perma.cc/C7H9-469P] (describing holographic wills as recommendable only “in an
emergency situation as a last resort”).
JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 643-46 (10th
ed. 2017) (listing the eleven states that have adopted a version of the Uniform Probate Code’s
harmless error rule: California, Colorado, Hawaii, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio,
Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, and Virginia).
MINN. STAT. § 524.2-503 (2020).
UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT § 5(a)(3) (2019).
33
34

35

36

37
38
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concept in the absence of a legislative sea change. 39 In addition to validating
electronic wills, the Act offers remote attestation. 40 Recognizing that remote
attestation cannot satisfy judicial interpretations of the presence requirement
that accept nothing short of physical presence, the UEWA’s remoteattestation provisions invent the concept of “electronic presence.”
Electronic presence is defined as “the relationship of two or more
individuals in different locations communicating in real time to the same
extent as if the individuals were physically present in the same location.” 41
Taken to its logical extreme, electronic presence eliminates the requirement
of physical presence and substitutes the requirement of presence in real
time. As an alternative to witnessing altogether, the UEWA offers
legislatures the option of allowing wills to be notarized instead of witnessed.
The provision is consistent with a 2008 amendment to the Uniform Probate
Code that to date has had little success. 42
The UEWA de-emphasizes remote attestation by stating its intent not
to alter the witnessing requirements for wills established by each state but
instead to make remote attestation optional for electronic wills. 43 By
bracketing a provision that is itself more controversial than electronic wills,
the Commission likely believed the UEWA would be more palatable to
legislatures that were on the fence about introducing digital elements into
will executions. The drafters of the UEWA shrewdly recognized that many
states would not be willing to embrace electronic wills and electronic
presence all at once but would prefer that the execution of an electronic will
take place with the testator and the witnesses in the physical presence of
each other. 44 The Commission thus made remote attestation an “option,” a
mechanism it employs for controversial provisions it believes states may
disfavor. 45 As discussed in more detail in Part IV.C., to date a few states have
enacted or are considering the UEWA or have enacted similar legislation,
but it has to be admitted that there is no discernible legislative trend
39
40
41
42
43

Gee, “Electronic Wills” Revolution, supra note 19.
UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT § 5(a)(3).
Id. § 2(2).
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(a)(3)(B) & cmt.

Id.

UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT §§ 5 legis. n. (2019).
A similar bracketing device has been employed in recent iterations of the Uniform
Parentage Act, wherein provisions relating to the parentage ramifications of surrogacy
agreements are made optional in case legislatures are unprepared to venture quite so far in
the direction of approving new reproductive technologies. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8 &
cmt. (2002); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8 & cmt. (2017). Professor Anne-Marie Rhodes has
suggested that “progressive” options offered by proposed uniform laws may undermine their
adoption by state legislatures. Anne-Marie Rhodes, Notarized Wills, 27 QUINNIPIAC PROB.
L.J. 419, 419, 431, 434 (2014) (describing the inclusion of notarized wills in the 2008
amendments to the Uniform Probate Code (“UPC”) as “a totally new concept that may
undermine the progressive reach of the UPC,” “lessen [its] desirability,” and “jeopardize
future considerations and enactments”).
44

45
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regarding remote attestation. Time will tell whether the option to reject
remote attestation can help persuade states to fulfill the primary objective of
the UEWA—electronic wills—in the spirit of “keep[ing] pace with the digital
age.” 46
In sum, before the pandemic, the primary efforts of policymakers to
bring wills into the digital age were very much limited to proposals to validate
electronic wills. Keeping remote attestation off the table in these efforts did
little to convince legislatures to approve of electronic wills. Thus, the
progress of wills law into the digital age has been sluggish and ineffective.
The concept of electronic presence in the UEWA’s bracketed remoteattestation option presaged the rush of states in early 2020 to adopt remote
attestation measures in order to make estate planning viable during the
coronavirus lockdown. As the next section will reveal, these emergency
measures have had the effect of promoting the UEWA’s goals, albeit in
reverse. The experiment with remote attestation has spurred a nationwide
discussion about making remote attestation and electronic wills permanent
features of probate law.
III.

THE PRESENCE REQUIREMENT

The formalities of creating an attested last will consist of the testator’s
signing the will followed by the witnesses’ signing the will. 47 In a variation,
the testator signs the will and later acknowledges this to the witnesses. The
witnesses then sign the will. 48 In yet a third and much more unusual option,
the testator acknowledges her signature before a notary public. 49 These
requisites are meant to guard against mistake, imposition, and fraud, and to
serve as evidence of the will’s authenticity and finality. 50 Most states require
strict compliance with the formalities of will execution, 51 with some adhering
to a more relaxed substantial compliance 52 or harmless error standard. Will
execution requirements exist in tension with the paramount concern of wills
law: determining and carrying out of the intent of the testator. While strict
compliance can undermine testatorial intent, 53 the alternatives to it, although
46
47
48

Bridget J. Crawford, Blockchain Wills, 95 IND. L.J. 735, 739 (2020).
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(a)(2)-(3)(A) (2019).

Id.

UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(a)(2), (3)(B); UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT § 5(a)(3)(B) (2019).
95 C.J.S. Wills § 220; 79 Am. Jur. 2d Wills § 232; Succession of Carter, 298 So. 3d 370,
373 (La. Ct. App. 2020).
See, e.g., Zaidman v. Zaidman, 305 So. 3d 330 (Fla. Ct. App. 2020); In re Estate of Loftus,
920 N.W.2d 718, 723 (Neb. Ct. App. 2018); Stevens v. Casdorph, 508 S.E.2d 610, 613 (W.
Va. 1998). Professor Melanie Leslie has theorized that judicial adherence to the strict
compliance doctrine may be less than has been claimed. Melanie Leslie, The Myth of
Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 259 (1996).
Carter, 298 So. 3d at 374.
In the Estate of Davies, 1 All E.R. 921, 922 (1951) (Eng.) (“I am compelled to decide the
49
50

51

52
53
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intent-promoting, may make room for the evils strict compliance is meant
to combat.
Presence is one of the requisites of will execution. The presence
requirement assumes different forms in attested-will execution
requirements throughout the country. 54 These can roughly be divided into
the witnesses’ presence and the testator’s presence. The statute may require
any or all of the following: (1) that the testator (a) sign the will in the presence
of the witnesses or (b) acknowledge to them that he has signed the will, 55 (2)
that the witnesses attest by signing in the testator’s presence that they saw the
testator sign the will or that he acknowledged his signature to them, and (3)
that the witnesses attest the will in the presence of each other. 56
As described in more detail below, the various presences required of
wills law all refer to a party to the execution of a will’s observation and
perception of another party’s signing the will in connection with making it
fully executed. Proof of presence thus contemplates two actions. One action
is doing the signing or acknowledging, while another action is observing the
signing or the acknowledgment. Presence also contemplates two parties, the
signer and the observer, both of whom must necessarily be present.
Establishing an observer’s presence at a signing is often a function of fixing
the location of the signer vis-à-vis the observer. The degree of physical
proximity that will satisfy the presence required of a will execution is
whatever is necessary to establish or infer that from this location the

case in accordance with the law, even though my decision has the effect of defeating the
purpose and intention of the testatrix.”); In re Colling, 1 W.L.R. 1440, 1442 (1972) (Eng. &
Wales).
Holographic wills do not require witnesses and are not the subject of this article. See, e.g.,
Jay M. Zitter, Requirement that Holographic Will, or Its Material Provisions, Be Entirely in
54

Testator’s Handwriting as Affected by Appearance of Some Printed or Written Matter Not
in Testator’s Handwriting, 37 A.L.R. 4d 528 (1985).
55

This requirement may require the simultaneous presence of the testator and both witnesses.

See, e.g., IND. CODE § 29-1-5-3(b)(1) (2021).
See, e.g., TEX. PROB. CODE § 251.051(3) (2017) (witnesses must attest the signature of the
56

testator and must sign in the testator’s presence); IND. CODE § 29-1-5-3(b)(2) (“The attesting
witnesses must sign in the presence of the testator and each other.”). The presence of the
testator when the witnesses sign is optional under some statutory schemes, particularly those
that allow the witnesses to sign the will after the testator has died. See, e.g., In re Estate of
Miller, 149 P.3d 840, 843 (Idaho 2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-502 cmt. A (2017). Some
statutes also have the requirements that the testator declare to the witnesses that the
document is his will and request that they sign it, but these are far from universal
requirements. Compare N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-2.1(a)(3) (McKinney 2021)
(“The testator shall, at some time during the ceremony or ceremonies of execution and
attestation, declare to each of the attesting witnesses that the instrument to which his signature
has been affixed is his will.”), and In re Estate of Fraccaro, 77 N.Y.S.3d 167, 171 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2018) (requiring “publication” of the will), with In re Estate of Holden, 261 Minn. 527,
536, 113 N.W.2d 87, 93 (Minn. 1962) (“[I]t is generally held that, in the absence of a statute
requiring publication, it is not necessary to show that the witnesses knew the nature of the
instrument.”).
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observer perceived the signing. 57 Physical and temporal proximity has been
a useful measure of the likelihood of awareness under the circumstances. 58
The problem of physical remoteness undermining presence arose in
case law long before the simultaneous audio-visual communication we know
today. In the summer of 1964, Charles Groffman sought to inject some
camaraderie into his estate planning by executing his will in the comfort of
a gathering of dear friends hosted by the Blocks. 59 The Groffmans, the
Leighs, and the Blocks were all in attendance. 60 Having received the
appropriate instructions from his attorney and having already signed his will,
Groffman at some point during the event gestured towards his coat, asking
Mr. Leigh and Mr. Block to be his witnesses. 61 He did not at that time
acknowledge that he had already signed his will. 62 Groffman then retrieved
his will from the pocket of his coat and proceeded into an adjoining room. 63
One after the other, Block and Leigh entered and left, each one signing the
will on a line below Groffman’s signature. 64 The three parties to the
execution of the will were never together in the adjoining room at the same
time. 65 Whatever acknowledgment of his signature Groffman may have
made to Block and Leigh individually, then, had at no time been done with
them “present at the same time.” 66 Because British courts require strict
compliance with will execution formalities, 67 the court declared that
Groffman’s will was not properly executed and distributed his estate by
intestate succession. 68
The remoteness of the witnesses from each other at the relevant point
in time was what doomed Groffman’s estate plan. Amendments made to
the Wills Act in 1982 relaxed certain will execution requirements 69 but did
See infra notes 69–71, 78–91, and accompanying text.
In re Tracy’s Estate, 182 P.2d 336 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947) (emphasizing, in part, the
timing of the witnesses’ signatures immediately after the testator’s); In re Demaris’ Estate,
110 P.2d 571, 582 (Or. 1941) (“They are in his presence whenever they are so near him that
he is conscious of where they are and of what they are doing.”); Kitchell v. Bridgman, 267 P.
26, 27 (Kan. 1928) (stating the issue as “whether, in this proximity, and under the
circumstances mentioned, the will was signed by the witnesses in the presence of the
testator”).
Groffman v. Groffman [1969], 2 All ER 108, 109 (Probate Div. 1969) (Eng).
57
58

59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Id.
Id. at 111.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Wills Act, (1837) § 9 (UK)).

Wills Act, (1837) § 9 (UK). The court concluded that no acknowledgment had been made
to either witness. Groffman, 2 All ER at 113.
J. Gareth Miller, Substantial Compliance and the Execution of Wills, 36 INT’L & COMP.
L.Q. 559, 560, 564 (1987).
Groffman, 2 All ER at 113.
Administration
of
Justice
Act
1982
§
17
(UK),
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1982/53/section/17 [https://perma.cc/8PAE-5ZRR].
66

67

68
69
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not in any way change the “present at the same time” requirement that was
at issue in the case. 70 Groffman emphasizes that physical proximity is
necessary to ensure that the witnesses perceive the same set of events
constituting either the signing of the will or the acknowledgment. This
understanding of what presence requires appears to establish a “singleroom” standard evoking the typical will execution ceremony around a table
in a law office. Otherwise, the court would have been interested to know
what Leigh, having remained in the adjoining room, was capable of
perceiving about the transaction occurring between Groffman and Brock. 71
The single-room standard can be stretched under current law in Britain only
so far as witnessing the execution of the will through a window. 72 As a policy
matter, this conception of the presence requirement seeks to ensure that the
witnesses have the same information relevant to the will’s authenticity and
the testator’s resolve to finalize it. 73 Under any microscope, Groffman offers
a particularly rigid conception of presence at odds with the realities of living
through a pandemic.
Although the “present at the same time” requirement applied in
Groffman conjures up an image of the two witnesses standing or sitting next
to each other in the same room, the typical statute does not require any
specific degree of physical proximity. 74 Instead, most courts that have
inquired into the purpose of the presence requirement construe it to be
aimed at establishing a mental perception made more likely by physical
proximity than by physical remoteness. Courts thus place the emphasis not
so much on physical proximity as on mental perception, the ability to
receive visual or aural stimuli and to understand these as signaling that the
signing of a will is taking place. 75 Courts that reason in this direction
understand that close physical proximity is obviously a useful proxy for
presence, but at the same time they have broadened the presence
requirement beyond the “one-room” rule of Groffman to admit that the
70
71

Miller, supra note 67, at 564.
See Groffman, 2 All ER at 108.

Casson v. Dade (1781) 1 Bro. C. C. 99 (Thurlow, L.C.) (Gr. Brit.). The requirement that
each witness must sign the will in the presence of the testator has been relaxed to enable each
witness to either sign the will or acknowledge his signature on the will in the presence of the
testator.
Administration
of
Justice
Act
1982
§
17
(UK),
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1982/53/section/17 [https://perma.cc/8PAE-5ZRR].
A properly worded self-proving affidavit, which often contains assertions that the witnesses
believed the testator to be of sound mind and free of undue influence when he executed the
will, is prima facie evidence of testamentary capacity. Hugenel v. Estate of Keller, 867
S.W.2d 298, 302 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Matter of Schmidt, 148 N.Y.S.3d 477, 480 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2021); Matter of Hadden, 135 N.Y.S.3d 124, 126 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020); In re
Rottkamp, 945 N.Y.S.2d 394, 396–97 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012).
Physical proximity may be required where someone signs in the testator’s stead. See, e.g.,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-502(4) (2019) (“‘[C]onscious presence’ requires physical
proximity to the testator but not necessarily within testator's line of sight.”).
See infra notes 84–91 and accompanying text (discussing the conscious presence test).
72

73

74

75
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perception or awareness that another party is signing a will does not depend
upon this degree of physical proximity. 76
Given most courts’ understanding of presence as a mental perception,
the one-room test is happily not a feature of the American jurisprudence on
presence in will execution. American courts invented terms, such as “lineof-sight” and “conscious,” to describe these varieties of presence. These
terms have also found their way into legislative enactments. 77 Judicial
decision making around these varieties of presence reveals that line-of-sight
presence aligns with a strict conception of presence and conscious presence
to one that is more relaxed.
Line of sight presence requires the following:
Courts adhering to the literal or strict construction rule generally
hold that in order to constitute the attestation of a will in the
presence of testator he must be able to see the instrument on the
desk or table, to see the pen in the hand of witness, and to see
and observe the movement of his hand and arm while in the act
of signing his name. 78
The line-of-sight test is a test of “contiguity, with an uninterrupted view
between the testator and the subscribing witnesses.” 79 The test permits the
witness or testator not to see the actual signing of the document if she could
see it from where she was sitting or standing by pivoting her body. The
standard is permissive enough that the testator may even choose to look
away. 80 But at some point, the testator’s or witnesses’ remoteness from the
proceedings will raise the specter of fraud, the primary concern inhibiting
any relaxation of the presence requirement. As such, under the line-of-sight
test, the witness must be capable of seeing the testator sign the will from the
witness’s actual position, even if that position requires the witness to lean
sideways or forward to do so. 81 Courts have ruled that there was an
insufficient line of sight in cases where the testator and a witness attempted
attestation over the telephone, 82 through a window not allowing a view of the

Whitacre v. Crowe, 972 N.E.2d 659, 664 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012) (referring to the testator’s
“understanding that the witnesses were signing the will”); In re Demaris’ Estate, 110 P.2d
571, 582 (Or. 1941); Healey v. Bartlett, 59 A. 617, 618 (N.H. 1904) (exploring if the testator
understood and was conscious of what the witnesses were doing when they signed the will);
Calkins v. Calkins, 75 N.E. 182, 183 (Ill. 1905) (referring to “conscious personal
knowledge”).
See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 2107.03 (2012); TEX. PROB. CODE § 4:69 (1997).
Moore v. Glover, 163 P.2d 1003, 1006 (Okla. 1945).
Calkins, 75 N.E. at 183.
76

77
78
79
80

Id.

81

Nichols v. Rowan, 422 S.W.2d 21, 24 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).

82

In re Heaney’s Will, 75 Misc. 2d 732, 735 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1973); In re Jefferson’s Will, 349

So. 2d 1032, 1036 (Miss. 1977).
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signing, 83 or were present in contiguous rooms where the only available line
of sight would have been through an intervening, opaque wall. 84
The conscious presence test can be met by a line of sight but extends
beyond it under certain circumstances to permit a broader set of failures to
actually see or be capable of seeing the signing:
[I]f the attesting witnesses are in range of view of the testator and
can or could have been plainly seen while in the act of signing
their names and the body and person of witnesses could have
been plainly seen while so doing, such facts are sufficient to
sustain a finding that the will was attested in the presence of
testator even though he might not at the time have been able to
see the instrument on the desk or table at which the witness was
seated nor to see the pen in his hand or to observe the motion of
his hand and arm while in the act of subscribing his name
thereto. 85
The conscious presence test validates attestation as long as the
witnesses are within the testator’s “range of vision,” or if he can “hear and
understand that [they] are subscribing and attesting.” 86 At a minimum, there
must be a consciousness or perception on the part of the person required
to be present that another is signing the document. Often that consciousness
is a function of the proximity of the actors, 87 as where a testator could see
the witnesses signing the will on the threshold of the doorway of the room
where she was sitting, 88 and even when the testator could not see the witness
signing her will but could perceive the signing by viewing the upper body of
the witness through a pane of glass.
The conscious presence test is even broader under some iterations,
namely the Restatement, which provides: “[i]f the testator and the witnesses
are near enough to be able to sense each other’s presence, typically by being
within earshot of one another, so that the testator knows what is occurring,
the presence requirement is satisfied.” 89 Courts employing this broader
conception understand conscious presence to comport with being “within
range of any of a person’s senses.” 90 It is thus a “mental apprehension test”
In re Estate of Weber, 387 P.2d 165, 170 (Kan. 1963).
Morris v. Estate of West, 643 S.W.2d 204, 206 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982); McCormick v. Jeffers,
637 S.E.2d 666 (Ga. 2006); Whitacre v. Crowe, 972 N.E.2d 659 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012); In
re Estate of Fischer, 886 A.2d 996 (N.H. 2005).
Moore v. Glover, 163 P.2d 1003, 1006 (Okla. 1945).
Whitacre, 972 N.E.2d at 664.
In re Estate of Fischer, 886 A.2d 996, 999 (N.H. 2005) (holding alternatively that the
witnesses were so near the testatrix that she was conscious of their actions).
In re Estate of Holden, 261 Minn. 527, 535, 113 N.W.2d 87, 93 (Minn. 1962).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP: WILLS & DON. TRANS. § 3.1 cmt. p (Am. L. Inst. 1999).
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 851.035 (1997); Calkins v. Calkins, 75 N.E. 182, 183 (Ill. 1905)
(referring to “the medium of other senses”).
83
84

85
86
87

88
89
90
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that focuses on either the visual or the auditory consciousness of the person
required to be present. 91 For example, in In re Tracy’s Estate, the witnesses
signed the will in a room twenty-five feet away from the testator so that he
could not see them sign. The court ruled that he could hear them sign, and
that was all the conscious presence test required. 92
At times, the relevant statute will suggest different qualities of presence
in connection with the execution and the attestation. For example, the word
“presence” may appear in the statute with respect to the testator’s watching
the witnesses sign, while the words “see” or “hear” are used to describe the
witnesses’ awareness of the testator’s signing his will or acknowledging that
he has signed it. 93 Presence is thus multifaceted; above all, the witnesses and
the testator must usually be in the presence of one another as they complete
their respective tasks, but not always. The reality under American law is that
relatively few jurisdictions require the witnesses to see the testator sign the
will and to attest to what they saw while all in the presence of one another.94
Nonetheless, the meaning of presence is far from intuitive and has been
litigated frequently.
The Uniform Probate Code mentions “conscious presence” only with
respect to one who signs in the testator’s stead, describing the witnesses’
responsibility as “witness[ing]” the testator sign the will or acknowledge his
signature. 95 There is no explicit requirement that the testator or the other
witness be present when each witness signs the will. Indeed, in some
versions of this provision, the witnesses may sign the will after the testator’s
death. 96 In addition to these more flexible requirements, the Uniform
Probate Code embodies the harmless error doctrine, permitting mistakes in
execution to be excused if clear and convincing evidence establishes that the
testator intended the document to be his will. Errors are thought to be
harmless where “the defective execution did not result from irresolution or
from circumstances suggesting duress or trickery.” 97 Most states have not
adopted this rule explicitly, but some nonetheless have a policy of
construing the will execution requirements in whatever manner that favors
“effectuating the testator’s intent to make a valid will.” 98
91

OHIO REV. CODE § 2107.03 (2012).

92

In re Tracy’s Estate, 182 P.2d 336, 336–37 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947).
See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 2107.03 (2012). In Whitacre, one of the issues was whether

93

the witnesses were in the conscious presence of the testator when she signed her will. The
Ohio statute, however, makes no reference to conscious presence with respect to this part of
the transaction but requires the witnesses to have seen the testator sign.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 732.502(1)(c); IND. CODE §§ 29-1-21-4(a)(4)-(5); W. VA. CODE §
41-1-3 (2022).
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(a)(3)(A).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-502(1)(c)(I) (2017).
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 cmt.
IND. CODE § 29-1-5-3(h) (2017). Some statutes declare the failure to follow certain statutory
requirements to have no effect on the validity of the instrument, but these provisions do not
94

95
96
97
98
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A. When the Testator Signs the Will
Due attestation of the testator’s signature requires each witness to be
present in some capacity, whether to see the testator sign the will 99 or to have
him acknowledge to her that he signed. 100 Under some statutory regimes, the
testator may also have to publish the will 101 and request that the witnesses
sign it. 102
In contrast to the testator’s presence when the witnesses sign the will,
the issue of the witnesses’ presence when the testator signs or acknowledges
is barely litigated. 103 It is of course mentioned in the recitation of the facts in
challenges to the proper execution of the will, 104 but it is usually not the issue.
This may be a function of the signature of the testator being considered the
most important facet of will execution: under prevailing law “[i]f the testator
did not sign, the will would fail.” 105 And if the testator’s signature is absent
from the will, there will likely be other deficiencies in execution. There will,
for example, be no witnesses to it. Whether under the harmless error rule
the absence of the testator’s signature (and by extension the absence of any
attestation) can be excused remains an open question, with at least two
courts deciding this question in the affirmative 106 and other jurisdictions
drawing the line at excusing the absence of the testator’s signature from the
will.

B. When the Witnesses Sign the Will
Because the presence of the testator when the witnesses sign the will is
not a feature of all Wills Acts, 107 it may seem counter-intuitive that there is
more litigation about this requirement than about the witnesses’ presence at
extend to the presence requirement. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.17 (McKinney
2017) (failure to provide notice to trustee does not invalidate amendment to or revocation of
trust instrument); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-2.1 (McKinney 2017) (failure of
witness to include her address on will does not invalidate will).
See, e.g., Bassford v. Bassford, 183 A.3d 680, 689 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).
See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-2.1(a)(4) (McKinney 2021); IND. CODE
§ 29-1-5-3(b)(1) (2017). Not every provision specifies that the acknowledgment must be done
in the presence of the witness. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-502 (2017); ARK. CODE
§ 28-25-103(b)(1)(B) (2019).
IND. CODE § 29-1-5-3 (b)(1) (2017).
A request that the witness sign is a rarity in the statutes but does appear in a few
jurisdictions’ law. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWER & TRUSTS LAW § 3-2.1 (McKinney 2017).
See e.g., Stevens v. Casdorph, 508 S.E.2d 610, 612 (W.Va. 1998) (“Ms. McGinn and Ms.
Waldron did not actually witness Mr. Miller signing his will.”).
See, e.g., Kitchell v. Bridgman, 267 P. 26, 27 (Kan. 1928).
Rhodes, supra note 45, at 423.
99

100

101
102

103

104
105

In re Estate of Ehrlich, 47 A.3d 12, 19 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012); In re Will of
Bradway, No. A-4535-16T3, 2018 WL 3097060, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 25,
2018); In re Estate of Attia, 895 N.W.2d 564, 568 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016).
106

UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(a)(3). The commentary explains that there is “no requirement
that the witnesses sign before the testator’s death.” UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502 cmt.

107
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the testator’s signing. The impression that the presence of the testator is of
less importance than the witnesses’ presence for the testator’s signing may
contribute to the parties taking this requirement less seriously and more
readily making mistakes. After all, there is some movement in the law to
eliminate the witnessing requirement altogether. The sense that the
witnessing requirement should be optional lies behind the notarization
option for wills under the Uniform Probate Code. 108 Moreover, some
statutes have even done away with the interested-witness penalty, 109
suggesting, again, that the witnessing function contributes little to the
proceedings. Finally, in contrast to the absence of the testator’s signature,
the harmless error rule has allowed wills to stand even though they were not
witnessed at all. 110
The purpose of requiring the testator’s presence when the witnesses
sign is to ensure that no fraudulent substitution is taking place: the testator
should be able to perceive that the witnesses are signing his will. 111 On this
subject, one court has reasoned,
[T]he object of the law is to prevent fraud and imposition upon
the testator or the substitution of a surreptitious will, and to effect
that object it is necessary that the testator shall be able to see and
know that the witnesses have affixed their names to the paper
which he has signed and acknowledged as his will. 112
Problems arise, of course, when, after the witnesses see the testator
sign or receive the testator’s acknowledgment, they depart and sign the will
elsewhere. That “elsewhere” may fall outside of the ambit of the testator’s
presence and undermine the purpose of his presence when they sign. 113
IV.

WILL EXECUTION IN CYBERSPACE

When spreading coronavirus infections led to lockdowns around the
globe, best practices in the execution of wills became untenable. It made no
difference that a few jurisdictions had enacted electronic will legislation or
that numerous web sites were already offering online assistance with wills.
None of these avenues gave consumers any way of finalizing their wills in a

Rhodes, supra note 45, at 427. Rhodes opines that the elimination of witnesses would not
serve the same ritual and protective functions of the attestation requirement. Id. at 429, 431.
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-505.
See, e.g., In re Estate of Hall, 51 P.3d 1134, 1136 (Mont. 2002) (“The court could
reasonably interpret this testimony to mean that Jim and Betty expected the Joint Will to
stand as a will until Cannon provided one in a cleaner, more final form.”).
In re Will and Estate of Jefferson, 349 So. 2d 1032, 1036 (Miss. 1977); In re Demaris’
Estate, 110 P.2d 571, 581 (Or. 1941).
Calkins v. Calkins, 75 N.E. 182, 183 (Ill. 1905).
See, e.g., Morris v. Estate of West, 643 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
108

109
110

111
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manner consistent with lockdown protocols. 114
Recognizing how quarantines and lockdowns spawned by the
pandemic have undermined effective estate planning, governors and
legislatures have taken the unprecedented step of making remote attestation
available while continuing to prohibit electronic wills. These jurisdictions
have recognized that, at a minimum, the necessary mechanism for pursuing
estate planning during the pandemic is remote witnessing. This mechanism
has been made available predominantly through executive orders, with
some jurisdictions opting for legislation or changes to court rules. By and
large, they are temporary measures, defined as either lasting for the duration
of the public health emergency in that state 115 or subject to periodic
extensions as the health emergency continues. 116
There are about twenty jurisdictions that have decided to move in this
direction, 117 some with very detailed provisions and some with terribly vague
ones. The broad outlines of the provisions have many similarities, but in
this rapidly evolving context there is no way, shape, or form, to characterize
these provisions as uniform, nor is it clear from what source states are
borrowing the language used in their provisions.
Some of the similarities and differences between these provisions are
as follows. “Remote” in this context means “using technology that enables
the testator, notary, or the person making the acknowledgment and the
person executing the document and witnesses to, while in different
locations, simultaneously communicate orally and maintain visual
contact.” 118 In states that require physical presence for will execution, the
measures act as temporary suspensions of any prohibition on remote
attestation that the will execution statute might be assumed to contain. 119 In
Like many hair and nail estheticians who took their trade outdoors, some estate planning
lawyers conducted will execution ceremonies alfresco during the coronavirus pandemic. See,
e.g., In re Ryan, 140 N.Y.S.3d 682, 682–83 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2021) (describing law office’s
conducting will execution ceremonies in its parking lot).
See, e.g., S.B. 241, 31st Leg. (Alaska 2020) (enacted); Conn. Exec. Order No. 7Q (Mar.
30, 2020).
Bob Friedman, Remote Signing of NY Estate Planning Documents Extended Until
October 4th, FRIEDMAN & RANZENHOFER (Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.wnylawyers.com/2020/09/remote-signing-of-ny-estate-planning-documents-extended-untiloctober-4th/ [https://perma.cc/59NV-5SA3].
Twenty states of this type have been identified, although it bears noting that the eight in
italics are holographic will jurisdictions: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, Tennessee, Wyoming. See
Emergency Remote Notarization and Remote Witnessing Orders, AM. COLL. OF TR. & EST.
COUNS., supra note 14.
S.B. 241, § 25(c), 31st Leg. (Alaska 2020) (enacted). Some definitions specify Skype, Zoom
and FaceTime as examples of videoconferencing applications. See, e.g., Ark. Exec. Order
No. 20-12(7) (Mar. 30, 2020).
Proclamation of the Governor of Alabama, Fifth Supplemental State of Emergency:
114

115

116

117

118

119
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states that require mere presence, the real-time audio-visual connection is
defined as being “in person” or “in the presence of.” 120
In all models, the witnesses must see the testator sign, but there is
variation in how and when the witnesses sign. Witnesses are provided a copy
of the document or the signature page, which they may sign on the spot, or
within a specified timeframe (perhaps forty-eight hours). The result is an
awkward system of electronic transmission of the testimonium and
attestation page of the will to be printed by each witness at their location,
signed, and then transmitted back to the testator executing his will without
an attorney or to the attorney who is overseeing the ceremony. The
counterparts are considered the will, or, on the strength of the counterparts,
an original document will be circulated to the witnesses via U.S. mail for
them to sign within thirty days of the execution ceremony, resulting in a
single will indistinguishable from one executed pre-pandemic, not an
electronic will. 121 If the latter applies, the date of the will’s validity relates
back to the date of execution and attestation. 122
Some models require the parties to confirm one another’s identities
before the execution commences 123 and that they are all present in the state.
Some of the more detailed versions describe the line of sight that witnesses
must have of the testator signing the will 124 and require the testator to show
the witnesses each page of the document one at a time and initial each page
during this exercise. The witnesses’ attestations may be more in the form of
a certification that all of this has taken place and, in that regard, more like a
self-proving affidavit than like a traditional attestation.
These measures vary in character and contain a variety of limitations
and requirements. A common requirement is that the remote attestation be
documented, verified or justified with additional safeguards. This might
include that the attestation be supervised 125 or recorded for possible later
playback, that a statement be appended to the will, that copies be sent to the
Coronavirus (COVID-19) (III)(B) (Apr. 2, 2020) (declaring witnessing remotely to count as
witnessing “in person”); Iowa Proclamation of Disaster Emergency (Mar. 22, 2020)
(suspension to the extent physical presence is required).
See, e.g., Ark. Exec. Order No. 20-12(6).
See Ark. Exec. Order No. 20-12(8) (recognizing that if the witnesses are in different
locations “they must necessarily sign separate signature pages”); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 6/1520(e) (“The prohibition on electronic signatures . . . remains in full effect.”); 755 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 6/15-20(f) (referring to the parties’ signing “in counterparts”); Kan. Exec. Order No.
20-20(2) (Apr. 9, 2020).
N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202.14 (Apr. 7, 2020) (“The witness(es) may repeat the witnessing
of the original signature page(s) as of the date of the execution . . . .”).
755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 6/15-15.
755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 6/15-20(d)(6) (“[T]he act of signing shall be captured sufficiently up
close on the 2-way audio-video communication for the witness to observe.”); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 700.1202(f) (2020) (same).
Conn. Exec. Order No. 7Q(g) (“Any witnessing requirement for a Last Will and
Testament may be satisfied remotely through the use of Communication Technology if it is
completed under the supervision of a Commissioner.”).
120
121

122

123
124

125

844

2022]

LEGACIES OF A PANDEMIC

845

witnesses, or that the testator or supervisor of the proceedings be shown
identification documents by each of the witnesses. 126 In Alaska, for example,
a statement must be attached to the will certifying that those who executed
or attested the will remotely are “at higher risk for severe illness from novel
coronavirus disease” or have been advised by a health care provider or
governmental agency “that being in the physical presence of others may
expose me or others to a health risk related to novel coronavirus disease.” 127
Other jurisdictions require a notary to be present to verify the identities of
the witnesses, 128 while others require that the proceedings be recorded and
kept for a specified number of years. 129 Some of the more detailed versions
go further to require the session to be supervised by an attorney, a notary 130
or, as in Connecticut, 131 a “Commissioner.” This supervising entity is
someone who will certify that all has been done correctly and who will retain
custody of the recording. Some provisions, but by no means all, prohibit
interjurisdictional witnessing or attestation of the will, a matter explored
below in Part IV.C. 132
Whether these efforts will be merely temporary or something more
long-lasting remains to be seen. In a course in wills, trusts and estates at the
City University School of Law (“CUNY”), I conducted experiments in
remote attestation and notarization (for self-proving the will) that required
students to fill in the procedural gaps in New York’s hastily drafted executive
order permitting the remote attestation of wills. These experiments revealed
not only the executive order’s shortcomings, but also the direction future
legislation would have to take for a permanent directive to be viable.
On June 10 and September 13, 2021, each student enrolled in my
Wills, Trusts & Estates at CUNY Law School participated in a mock online
execution of a will. 133 The need to conduct the simulated will execution
ceremony in this manner was necessitated by CUNY’s resorting to online
instruction beginning in mid-March of 2020, the lockdown of New York
State on March 22, 2020, and in part by the Governor of New York’s order
of April 7, 2020, permitting remote attestation. Prior to April 7, the typical
will execution ceremony in a law office was rendered unavailable by the

Proclamation of the Governor of Alabama, Fifth Supplemental State of Emergency:
Coronavirus (COVID-19) (III)(B) (Apr. 2, 2020); Eleventh Modification of the Declaration
of a State of Emergency for the State of Delaware Due to a Public Health Threat (B)(2)(b)
(Apr. 15, 2020).
Enrolled
SB
241,
ALASKA
STATE
LEGISLATURE
https://www.akleg.gov/basis/Bill/Text/31?Hsid=SB0241Z [https://perma.cc/BE7R-SBFT].
See, e.g., Ark. Exec. Order No. 20-12(6).
Me. Exec. Order 37 FY 19/20(II)(B)(15) (Apr. 8, 2020).
See, e.g., Ark. Exec. Order No. 20-12(6).
Conn. Exec. Order No. 7Q(3)(g).
Tenn. Exec. Order No. 72(3)(b) (Dec. 22, 2020) (declaring that the signer and the
witnesses “must each be physically located in Tennessee”).
The enrollment in these courses was 36 and 43, respectively.
126

127

128
129
130
131
132

133
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lockdown, leaving testators to conduct their own backyard ceremonies, 134
sometimes under the direction of an attorney and sometimes without. The
executive order remained in effect through June 24, 2021, when it was
declared “no longer necessary.” 135
Executive Order 202.14 was not meant to help wills law “catch up with
technology” but to use technology as a stopgap to address a set of conditions
that makes the traditional manner of executing wills untenable. The
directive results in a physical document, the traditional will. Witnessing is
by simultaneous teleconference, but neither the document nor any of the
signatures are digital. Remote witnessing under this executive order requires
a paper copy of the will, scanners, e-mail, printers, and a courier service to
effect a properly executed and witnessed will. Even the self-proving affidavit,
which can be notarized remotely, winds up in paper format. By any
measure, the procedure is cumbersome and confusing. It requires a fair
amount of guesswork about what is required.
The class met in groups of three to four in Zoom breakout rooms. As
I moved through the rooms in which the will execution ceremonies were
taking place, trying to be a fly on the wall but clearly disrupting their flow, it
became obvious to me that my students were finding and trying to address
the gaps in the governor’s executive order as they went along. On more than
one occasion, I was asked for a step-by-step explanation of the procedure,
something I obviously could not provide. My lawyers-in-training were in the
unenviable position of simultaneously assisting a client with an important
transaction and conducting statutory interpretation.
As the students were puzzling over how to implement the vague set of
instructions in a manner that would result in a valid will, I had to caution
them against proceeding in a way that felt second-nature to them. Their
immediate instinct was to imagine that the remote execution and attestation
of a will would involve the signatories sharing a document, say, on a Google
Docs-type platform and each typing their names on the appropriate line in
the manner of DocuSign. Several groups gravitated automatically to
“signing” the will online in this fashion. Their instinct revealed the close
association my students, who spend much of their time online, draw in both
directions between electronic wills and remote witnessing.
Others were concerned about what might be going on outside of the
range of the camera. Was someone orchestrating the testator’s actions from
the wings? Was the testator’s appearance enhanced with lights and filters or
even computer-generated imagery? These are certainly not fanciful
concerns in a world where digital images can so often look like the “real
thing,” even when they are altered by tools to which consumers have easy
See Brian M. Sweet, Executing Wills and Trusts While Observing Distancing Guidelines,
N.Y.
CMTY.
TR.
(May
18,
2020),
https://www.nycommunitytrust.org/newsroom/professional-notes/executing-wills-and-trustswhile-observing-distancing-guidelines/ [https://perma.cc/7LU6-ZGNE].
N.Y. Exec. Order 210 (June 24, 2021).
134

135
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access. Nonetheless, just as the possibility of fraud appears to be barely there
in so many due execution challenges, 136 it was likely they were concocting
scenarios that would be highly improbable in the vast majority of cases.
Finally, students noted jurisdictional questions unfamiliar to them
from pre-pandemic legislation. The procedure is not meant to allow for the
execution of a will in Connecticut to be considered valid in New York or,
for parties present in different jurisdictions, to be able to execute a will at
all. A testator in Rouses Point, New York, on Lake Champlain, for example,
could execute a will with witnesses on the other side of the state in Clymer,
New York, 375 miles away as the crow flies, but could not include a witness
across the bridge in Alburgh, Vermont, only 1.1 miles away. Since my
students were spread out across the country, we were engaged in an exercise
that more than likely could not have resulted in a validly executed will under
such an “interjurisdictional” prohibition. True, probate courts routinely
admit to probate wills that have been validly executed in other jurisdictions
either in conformity with the law of that jurisdiction or the law of the
testator’s domicile, but it was not clear that in any of the breakout rooms,
the execution requirements of any state were being complied with.

A. Interjurisdictional Witnessing
Geographical specificity is one of the features of many remote
attestation provisions that raises questions. Whereas the presence question
discussed above is ubiquitous in wills law and has evolved in different
directions in different jurisdictions over the years, the validity of a will that
has been executed by parties simultaneously in multiple jurisdictions is one
of first impression. The imperfect analogy that comes to mind is the foreign
will—a will executed in accordance with the requisites of another jurisdiction.
If the testator was in that jurisdiction at the time he executed his will, it can
usually be probated in the testator’s state of domicile after he dies. 137 Probate
courts have the discretion to admit even the will of a nonresident. 138 And
some statutes allow the execution rules of the testator’s country of nationality
or jurisdiction where he has a residence to control the question of
admissibility to probate. 139 The policy behind broadening the range of
possible grounds for admissibility to probate is “to provide a wide
opportunity for validation of expectations of testators.” 140 These provisions
and decisions answer neither the question whether an electronic will may be
admitted to probate nor the question whether an interjurisdictionally
136
137

See, e.g., Snide v. Johnson, 52 N.Y.2d 193, 197 (1981).
See UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 1-301, 2-506 (“A written will is valid if executed in compliance

with the law . . . of the place where the will is executed . . . .”).
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 1-301(2) (granting the court jurisdiction over “the property of
nonresidents located in this state”).
See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-506.
See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-506 cmt.

138

139
140
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executed will may be admitted to probate.
Some remote attestation provisions present this problem of
geographical specificity by requiring the witnesses and the testator to all be
present in the same state when conducting a will-execution ceremony by
remote means, 141 a requirement not present in pre-pandemic legislation. To
envision this problem in a pre-pandemic context requires concocting an
extravagant hypothetical.
Imagine that a car is moving rapidly along an interstate highway in the
mid-Atlantic region of the United States. Depending upon the location (and
the level of traffic congestion), the car might move swiftly between states. On
Interstate 95, the car could travel quickly from New Jersey to Delaware and
on into Maryland. Further south, the same interstate will speed cars from
Maryland, through Washington, D.C., and on into Virginia. Further west,
cars on Interstate 81 will enter Maryland from Pennsylvania and after twelve
miles enter West Virginia. From there, it is a mere twenty-six miles to the
Virginia border.
Imagine further that a will execution ceremony is taking place inside
the car. The testator, seated in the backseat between the witnesses, is
listening to the attorney-notary, who is seated up front and is turning around
to face the occupants of the backseat and to explain to the how he will
conduct the proceedings. Given the rapid progress of the car along the
interstate highway, it is possible that the testator will sign the will in one state
and that each witness will attest his will in a second and a third, respectively.
If this journey is unfolding along Interstate 81, the attorney might even
complete the notarization of the self-proving affidavit in yet a fourth state.
A moving will execution ceremony is a fanciful way to conjure a
particular execution-related and jurisdictional question: can a will executed
interjurisdictionally be admitted to probate? The question presented relates
to the portability of wills. It is a question that may have occurred to
practitioners before the pandemic, but it is largely missing from willexecution jurisprudence. It arises now and will likely arise more often given
the probability that the temporary changes to the legal landscape brought
about by the pandemic will made permanent, at least in part, in a postpandemic world.
The question whether a court will admit a will to probate is both a
question of jurisdiction and execution. The jurisdictional question is rarely
controversial. The courts of a state have jurisdiction over a domiciliary’s
estate 142 and nonresidents’ property located in that state. 143
The execution question is somewhat more complicated. A court’s
jurisdiction over an estate does not mean that it will recognize a will intended
to control the disposition of that estate. That determination requires that the
141

See, e.g., Ark. Exec. Order No. 20-12(6).

142

UNIF. PROB. CODE § 1-301(1).

143

Id. at § 1-301(2).
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manner of the will’s execution be embraced within the state’s choice of law
provision. Some states only admit wills to probate that have been executed
in conformity with that state’s will execution formalities. 144 Most states are
more flexible and will “recognize a will if it complies with one of the
following: the local statute, the law of the place 145 of execution of the will at
the time of execution, or the law of the decedent’s domicile.” 146 A hybrid
choice of law provision allows wills that do not comply with the local will
execution rules, but only if they were “executed outside this state.” 147 This
approach sounds more restrictive than it actually is, since the law of the place
of execution may itself have a permissive choice of law provision. Finally,
other jurisdictions’ statutes make clear that the place of a will’s execution is
of no legal significance as long as the manner of the will’s execution
conforms to at least one of several permissible statutory regimes. 148 Choice
of law provisions sometimes broaden the typical bases for admission to
probate in other ways. These may include conformity either with the law at
the time the will was executed or at the time the testator died. 149 Still others
grant recognition to wills that have been admitted to probate in any other
jurisdiction. 150
The policy behind permissive choice of law provisions is “to provide a
wide opportunity for validation of expectations of testators.” 151 This policy,
coupled with the similarity in will execution requirements across
jurisdictions, means that, assuming a court has jurisdiction over some or all
of the estate, an individual will may be admissible to probate in several
jurisdictions and on several grounds. The Uniform Probate Code reflects
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 53-5-1. Note, however, that Georgia recognizes both attested
and holographic wills.
The UPC specifies that “place” means “when [the will] is executed in another state or
country.” UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-506 cmt..
Roger Andersen, Will Executions: A Modern Guide, 18 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 57, 58
(1994); see, e.g., 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-1 (“A will signed by the testator when proved as
provided in this Article may be admitted to probate in this State when (a) the will has been
admitted to probate outside of this State or (b) the will was executed outside of this State in
accordance with the law of this State, of the place where executed or of the testator's domicile
at the time of its execution.”).
See, e.g., TENN. CODE § 32-1-107 (stating, “a written will executed outside this state in a
manner prescribed by the law of the place of its execution or by the law of the testator’s
domicile at the time of its execution, shall have the same force and effect in this state as if
executed in this state in compliance with those sections”).
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.020 (1990) (“[E]xecuted in the mode prescribed by
the law of the place where executed or of the testator's domicile, either at the time of the
will’s execution or at the time of the testator’s death.”).
144

145

146

147

148

149

Id.

15 GUAM CODE ANN. § 1509 (2019) (“A will admitted to probate in any State or United
States territory, or established or proved in accordance with the laws thereof, may be offered
for probate in the Superior Court of Guam if the Superior Court of Guam has jurisdiction
under the provisions of Chapter 14 of this Title.”).
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-506 cmt.
150

151
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the policy by broadening admissibility to probate to include the law of the
state where the testator is domiciled, has a residence, or the country where
he is a national. 152 Under such broad and permissive choice of law
provisions, a court with jurisdiction over an estate is endowed with the power
to admit to probate wills executed under varying will execution models.
Although not a will-execution-in-a-moving-car case, the Washington
case of In re Hook 153 involved the cross-border completion of a will, even if
the court did not see it that way. The testator, Bert Hook, remained
unmarried and childless throughout his life. At the time of his death, he was
domiciled in Washington and had a residence in Arizona. His 1988 will,
executed in Washington, bequeathed his entire estate to his brother. In
2012, while in Arizona, Hook prepared a new will that included two of his
friends in the bequest to brother. A notary witnessed Hook’s signature, 154
but the second witness, Anna Levitte, signed the will in Washington after
Hook had passed away. 155 Washington had jurisdiction over the bulk of
Hook’s estate.
Washington’s law of will execution requires the witnesses to sign in the
presence of the testator. Washington will admit “foreign” wills to probate if
they comply with the law either of the place of their execution or of the
testator’s domicile. 156 Hook’s will did not comply with Washington’s
Id.; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 43-8-135 (“A written will is valid if executed in compliance with
section 43-8-131 or if its execution complies with the law at the time of execution of the place
where the will is executed, or with the law of the place where at the time of execution or at
the time of death the testator is domiciled, has a place of abode or is a national.”).
Atkinson v. Estate of Hook, 374 P.3d 215 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).
The attorney notarized the will, raising the issue of whether she had signed in the capacity
of a witness or in her capacity as a notary. Id. at 218; see In re Hammer’s Estate, 72 N.Y.S.2d
636, 637 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1946) (ruling that a notarization conducted to authenticate the
testator’s signature did not satisfy the witnessing requirement). Under the Uniform Probate
Code, the notarization of a will is sufficient by itself; witnesses are not required. UNIF. PROB.
CODE § 2-502(a)(3)(B).
The parties may have been under the mistaken impression that only notarization was
required to validate the will, but the decision is unclear on this point. See UNIF. PROB. CODE
§ 2-502 cmt.
The words “executed without this state” used to describe these other wills appeared in the
1917 version of the statute, PROB. CODE § 25, 1917 Wash. Sess. Laws, ch. 156, available at
https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1917c156.pdf?cite=1917%20c%2015
6%20§%2025 [https://perma.cc/7SK8-ULLX], survived revisions in 1929 and 1965, PROB.
CODE
§
25,
1929
Wash.
Sess.
Laws,
ch.
21,
available
at
https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1929c21.pdf?cite=1929%20c%2021
%20§%201 [https://perma.cc/Q5J5-3ZRK]; PROB. CODE § 11.12.020, 1965 Wash. Sess.
Laws,
ch.
145,
available
at
https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1965c145.pdf?cite=1965%20c%2014
5%20§%2011.12.020 [https://perma.cc/3X33-SF9N], but then were expressly stricken from
the statute in 1990, PROB. CODE § 11.12.020, 1990 Wash. Sess. Laws, ch. 78, available at
https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1990c79.pdf?cite=1990%20c%2079
%20§%201 [https://perma.cc/9F9N-2CHT]. It bears noting that “foreign wills” appears as a
152

153
154

155

156
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witnessing requirement, but it did comply with Arizona’s, which allows
witnesses to sign the will “within a reasonable time,” 157 even after the testator
has died. 158 Washington, though, could admit the will to probate under these
circumstances only if Arizona was the place of the will’s execution. The
court reasoned that Arizona was not the place of the will’s execution,
Washington was. This rather surprising conclusion about a will that was not
signed by the testator in Washington found support in both the trial and
appellate courts’ reasoning that a will is not executed until “the last formal
act necessary to make the will valid” takes place. In this sense, execution
“comprises the acts of the witnesses as well as the act of the testator.” 159 This
logic meant that Hook’s will was not actually executed until Levitte signed
it. 160 Since she was the last of witnesses to sign and signed the will in
Washington, the will was ipso facto executed in Washington. Hook’s will
was not a foreign will at all in the courts’ estimation. Thus, there could be
no exception: the will had to comply with Washington law, or it could not
be admitted to probate.
The Hook decision does not rest on firm footing. The law clearly
identifies the courts with jurisdiction over some or all of a decedent’s estate,
but it contains very little geographic specificity regarding where a will must
be executed to be admissible to probate. Indeed, no will execution statute
requires every will presented for probate to have been executed in that state.
Neither compliance with the local law nor compliance with the law of the
testator’s jurisdiction requires the will’s execution to happen in a particular
place. Tellingly, only one of the choice-of-law bases described by Professor
Anderson 161 for probating a will suggests a will might have a legally significant
“place of execution” at all. Linking all three of the grounds he describes is
the notion that a will needs to be in compliance with some statute
somewhere. Washington is now poised to embrace this position and to
eliminate any distinction between wills executed within and without the
state. 162 Its prior law forced the courts to make a distinction between
heading as early as 1917 but does not appear in the statutory text. The heading inexplicably
remained in place after the 1990 revision, which appears to render the “foreignness” of a will
irrelevant. In any event, section headings in section 11 of the Washington Revised Code are
not part of the law. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.02.001 (2021).
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2502(A)(3) (2019).
In re Estate of Jung, 109 P.3d 97, 99 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
Atkinson v. Estate of Hook, 374 P.3d 215, 219 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).
Id. at 216–17, 219, 220.
See Andersen, supra note 146, at 58.
See PROB. CODE § 11.12.020, 1990 Wash. Sess. Laws, ch. 78, available at
https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/documents/sessionlaw/1990c79.pdf?cite=1990%20c%2079
%20§%201 [https://perma.cc/9F9N-2CHT] (noting that Washington expunged the
descriptor “executed without this state” from the Revised Code of Washington 11.20.020 in
1990); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.20.100 (2021) (stating there shall be no distinction between
domestic and foreign wills, once probated); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.20.090 (2021)
157
158
159
160
161
162
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domestic and foreign wills that was then, and is now, out of step with wills
executed interjurisdictionally and is to blame for the perplexing discussion
of where Hook’s will was executed.
The Hook court’s conviction that “execution” has such a specific
meaning that the moment it occurs can be pinpointed with precision is the
weakest link in its reasoning. It will be helpful to distinguish certain terms
that in imprecise usage are often conflated. “Execution” refers to the
testator’s signature of his will. “Attestation” refers to the declaration the
witnesses make that they are present and witness the testator sign his will.
The attestation is confirmed by the witnesses’ signature, which in essence
embodies it. 163 These necessary components of finalizing a will are
sometimes performed separately. 164 The distinctions between them are
necessary because execution is sometimes thought to mean the entire
process of finalizing a will, as in a “will execution ceremony” or a will contest
brought on the basis of due execution or a “fully executed” will. Attestation
is folded into that use of the term execution and loses its independent
significance.
“Attestation” deserves further definition. It is sometimes thought to
mean the act of seeing the testator sign. 165 To attest a will, though, is to affirm
that one has witnessed the testator sign the will. Although attestation clauses
are sometimes written with present-tense verbs, they actually describe an act
that has already taken place, that the witnesses have already witnessed. The
self-proving affidavit, by contrast, employs past tense verbs. It is a document
in which the witnesses, and sometimes the testator, explain the role they
played in fulfilling the formalities of finalizing the will.
The Hook decision fails to acknowledge the nuances inherent in the
terms “executed” and “execution.” The terms do not have fixed meanings
in either legislation or jurisprudence. They are especially indefinite when
they appear unmodified by “complete,” “valid,” “effective” or words of
similar effect that the Hook court tellingly employs throughout the decision
without acknowledging either their significance or that they do not appear
in the statute. Even the lost wills statute the court relies on for support
requires proof of both the execution and the validity of the lost will. 166
Practitioners understand that a will execution connotes a process. The
process comprises compliance with all steps necessary for a will to be legally
enforceable upon the death of the testator. 167 “Execution” can also mean the

(appearing to define a foreign will as one that has been probated elsewhere, not necessarily
executed elsewhere).
In re Sloan’s Estate, 56 N.E. 952, 953 (Ill. 1900).
See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-2.1(a)(3), (b) (McKinney 2019).
Whitacre v. Crowe, 972 N.E.2d 659, 662 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012).
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.20.070(1) (2021).
Turlington v. Neighbors, 24 S.E.2d 648, 650 (N.C. 1943) (“The ‘execution’ of a deed
means . . . all acts which are necessary to give effect thereto.”) (citation omitted).
163
164
165
166
167
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specific moment of the will’s taking effect at the testator’s death 168 or refer to
the executor’s carrying out the directions in the will. 169 Even “due execution”
sometimes refers not merely to a proper will execution but to a probate
court’s sense of the will’s genuineness more broadly. 170
“Executed,” by contrast, connotes completion, but can refer variously
to completed tasks in the process or to the completion of the entire
ceremony. The most common use of the term is to describe the completion
by the testator of his signature, as where we speak of a testator’s executing
his will, 171 after which we might say that the witnesses have witnessed or
attested the execution of the will. 172 There are also examples, albeit less
common, of courts describing the witnesses’ attestations as their having
executed the will. 173 “Executed” can also refer to the completion of the
ceremony, after which courts typically include the modifier “fully” rather
than “partially” executed. 174
The Hook court seemed unaware of these varying usages, but more to
the point is its lack of acknowledgment of the common understanding that
the execution of a will is a process where the point of focus is the moment
the testator signs the document. When a testator signs his will, he exhibits
his resolve to render the appointive and dispositive provisions he has
included in the document legally enforceable should he then die. The
witnesses have two roles to fulfill. They are there to perceive to the testator’s
resolve and to attest to it by adding their own signatures to the will. In
essence, then, when they sign the document, the witnesses are attesting to
something they already have done. It is not accurate to say that the
attestation is the act of witnessing, as the court did in Whitacre v. Crowe. 175
168

Cent. Nat’l Bank v. Stevenson, 16 A.2d 114, 115 (Del. Ch. 1940).

In re Richardson’s Will, 229 N.Y.S. 299, 300 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1928).
In re Huston’s Estate, 27 N.W.2d 26, 28 (Iowa 1947).
See, e.g., In re Estate of Phillips, 112 N.W.2d 591, 596 (Wis. 1961); In re Estate of Picillo,
99 A.3d 975, 978 (R.I. 2014) (“The testatrix executed the will that night.”); In re Will of
169
170
171

Carter, 565 A.2d 933, 935 (Del. 1989); Succession of Hackney, 707 So. 2d 1302, 1306 (La.
Ct. App. 1998). In one particularly odd use of “executed,” the testator is said to have
executed a will “which she did not sign.” Durell v. Martin, 110 S.W.2d 316, 318 (Tenn.
1937).
See, e.g., Amerson v. Pahl, 734 S.E.2d 399, 400 (Ga. 2012); Phillips, 112 N.W.2d at 596;
In re Kelly’s Will, 174 S.E. 453, 454 (N.C. 1934); In re Holloway’s Estate, 235 P. 1012, 1016
(Cal. 1925); In re Tayrien’s Estate, 246 P. 400, 401 (Okla. 1926); In re Estate of Horowitz,
No. 92-T-4710, 1993 WL 150487, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 26, 1993).
In re Estate of Yelvington, 280 So. 2d 497, 498 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Hendry v.
Wilson, 151 S.W.2d 683, 683 (Ark. 1941).
Compare In re Estate of Goodwin, 18 P.3d 373, 375 (Okla. Civ. App. 2000) (contending
that every will, except a holographic or nuncupative will, must be subscribed at the end by
the testator, or another person, within his presence and by direction, must subscribe his
name), with Swain v. Lee, 700 S.E.2d 541, 543 (Ga. 2010) (stating that a will is partially
executed, and thus invalid, if it is not attested and subscribed in the presence of two
witnesses).
972 N.E.2d 659, 662 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012).
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Instead, it is a statement about what one has witnessed.
Statutes that allow the witnesses to sign the will within a reasonable time
of the testator’s having signed it recognize that where or when the witnesses
sign the document is really beside the point. Bolstering this understanding
are statutes that define the “place of execution” of a will as “the place where
the testator is physically present when the testator executes the will.” 176 These
principles render the Hook court’s declaration that Levitte’s signature in
Washington made the will ipso facto executed in Washington indefensible,
especially since nothing else of importance occurred there. The conclusion
is analytically lazy, making no sense doctrinally or as a matter of policy. The
court’s rigid adherence to the domestic-versus-foreign dichotomy allowed it
to sidestep a serious consideration either that the will was executed in
Arizona or, more importantly, that it was an interjurisdictional will,
executed, as it were, across borders and neither solely in Arizona nor solely
in Washington. To take issue with the court missing the opportunity to
consider the ramifications of interjurisdictionally executed wills, however, is
not to argue that Hook was wrongly decided. Washington admits to probate
wills executed under a number of different models. It is correct that Hook’s
2010 will did not satisfy any of these models, but that fact has nothing to do
with where the will was executed.
One important distinction between the fanciful will-execution-in-amoving-car hypothetical described above and the facts of Hook is that the
hypothetical describes a will execution ceremony, an event at which the
execution of the will is completed in one sitting. Under pre-pandemic
conditions, it was difficult to conceive of such a ceremony occurring across
borders. In Hook, the will execution was not a ceremony at all but was
performed piecemeal in a manner allowed by statutes that do not require
the testator to sign the will in the presence of the witnesses but instead to
“acknowledge” his signature to them later. 177 It is easy to imagine the
components of a will executed in this fashion to be completed in different
jurisdictions. Indeed, in Hook this is precisely what happened, with the
testator executing the will in one jurisdiction and one of the witnesses
attesting his signature in another.
Now that simultaneous audio-visual communication is a widely
accepted emergency measure for conducting will execution ceremonies, it
is just as easy to imagine a will execution ceremony occurring across
jurisdictional borders. When a will execution ceremony takes place in a
digital “room,” the testator and the witnesses may not all be in the same
jurisdiction when the will is executed. Some executive orders have
expressed concern about this possibility. Arkansas’s, for example, specifies
that the witnesses must verify that they are in the state. 178 Georgia’s proposed
176
177
178

See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2506(B) (2019).
See, e.g., id. at § 14-2502(A)(3).
Ark. Exec. Order No. 20-12(6).
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legislation is similar. 179 Illinois’s statute has no such requirement. 180
Michigan’s hybrid approach requires in-state presence of the witness unless
the document relates to a matter over which Michigan has jurisdiction. 181
The implications of requiring “unijurisdictionality” could mean that a
will executed with remote attestation in one jurisdiction with a witness across
the border in another state would not be admissible even in a state that had
jurisdiction over the decedent’s estate. Under its optional remote attestation
provision, the UEWA requires each witness to be a resident of a state and
present in a state when the witnessing takes place. 182 This is a curious
locution that has found its way into Colorado’s enactment 183 and the District
of Columbia’s proposed legislation. 184 By reference to the UEWA’s
definitions, this may simply mean that the witnesses need to be present in
and residents of the United States, its territories or possessions. 185 This
unusual language does not appear in Utah’s enactment of the UEWA. 186
Like most statutory schemes permitting remote attestation, Utah’s simply
contains no mention of where the witnesses need to be at the time of the
execution of the will in order for the will to be probatable at a later date.
It is clear that remote attestation has brought forth unanticipated
concerns about the location of the witnesses when they attest the will. Given
that the location of the attesting witness made little difference before the
pandemic, we are right to wonder what it is about remote attestation that
calls into question traditionally liberal choice of law principles. Had the
court in Hook been capable of conceptualizing an interjurisdictionallyexecuted will, it could have explained why such a will was inadmissible to
probate in Washington despite the interjurisdictionality. Under executive
orders prohibiting interjurisdictionally executed wills, it is the
interjurisdictionality itself that is the fatal flaw and not the limitations of the
choice of law statute. Under such an order, if Levitte had attended a will
execution ceremony overseen by an attorney and had attested Hook’s
signature from Washington, the will would fail due to the remote attestation
requirement that she be physically located in the state whose remote
attestation law is being employed. This new focus on unijurisdictional
execution introduces an unnecessary obstacle to validating wills for probate
within a legal landscape where the location of the witnesses has traditionally
assumed no significance. It more importantly seems out of step with the
Ga. H.B. 940 § 1 (requiring the witnesses to be residents of and “physically located in this
state”).
755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 6/15-10(a) (requiring the witnesses to be “located in the United
States at the time of the attestation”).
Mich. Exec. Order No. 2020-74 (June 30, 2020).
UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT § (5)(a)(3)(A).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-1305.
B24-0450, 2021 Leg., 24 Council (Wash. D.C. 2021).
UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT § 2(6).
UTAH CODE § 75-2-1405 (2020).
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need to address urgent estate planning imperatives with more remoteness
rather than less. Remote attestation laws should recognize that the place of
a will’s execution has no legal significance and that, as was largely true prepandemic, a probate court with jurisdiction over a testator’s estate should
look with favor upon the execution rules of whatever jurisdictions the
testator had significant contacts with.

B. Remote Presence
Several questions related to law reform arise when we consider the
extant law of presence and the ongoing remote attestation experiment
occurring in many states. The first is the most basic: is remote attestation
meant to satisfy the presence requirement? If not, can it be said to
substantially comply with it? To be a harmless error? The answer appears
to be no. After all, just as law reform efforts promoting electronic wills are
not meant to supplant extant law, 187 remote attestation is currently
understood to be a temporary fix to a (hopefully) temporary problem, the
resolution of which will enable us to return to the time when we could “hold
a contemporaneous execution ceremony at which the testator and all
subscribing witnesses are [physically] present and perform the requisite
acts.” 188 Under this understanding of the policy underlying pandemic-related
will-execution measures, nothing digital should be imported into wills law
that would upend established understandings of what can satisfy the
presence requirement. In short, we exist in a holding pattern waiting to
return to a status quo ante where electronic wills were receiving at best a
tepid degree of interest.
Before the pandemic, the idea of remote attestation probably sounded
futuristic and at odds with both the line-of-sight and conscious presence
versions of the presence requirement. But thanks to the measures adopted
in response to the pandemic, there is now a body of evidence that makes a
return to the status quo ante unlikely. As described in more detail below,
both completed and pending legislative activity portends that remote
attestation and electronic wills eventually will become permanent features
of our legal landscape. The budding legislative trend alone may mean that
the digital revolution in wills law is a train that has already left the station.
More likely, the experiment with remote attestation has revealed to
practitioners who have the ear of legislators that remote attestation, when set
alongside the meaning, purpose and application of the presence
requirement in wills law, is not only consistent with the line-of-sight and
conscious presence tests but likely superior to them.
UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT § 5 cmt. (“[A] state’s existing requirements for valid wills will apply
to electronic wills.”).
188
Katheleen R. Guzman, Where Strict Meets Substantial: Oklahoma Standards for the
Execution of a Will, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 543, 564 n.119 (2014).
187
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The predominating version of remote attestation, requiring the signing
to be “captured sufficiently up close on the two-way audio-video
communication for the witness to observe,” 189 provides better evidence than
does a will execution ceremony conducted in contiguous rooms that the
witnesses are “so near [the testator] that he is conscious of where they are
and of what they are doing.” 190 As was made clear from the experiment
described above, the witnesses could see the testator signing the will and vice
versa if appropriate adjustments to the camera were made, alleviating the
perceptual problems inherent in bank-teller and through-the-window
attestations that had to be handed over to courts for resolution. Remote
attestation removes any “material obstacle prevent[ing the testator] from
knowing of his own knowledge, or perceiving by his senses, the act of
attestation.” 191 Moreover, just as the testator could be required to show
identification via the camera, the testator, under the appropriate statutory
regime, could acknowledge her signature to the witnesses. Under statutes
that provide the option for the witnesses to sign at a later time, the testator
would not need to see the witnesses sign the will.
There is thus a strong case that simultaneous two-way video and audio
transmission, a method of communication unanticipated by courts that
created the line-of-sight and conscious-presence tests, satisfies any extant
presence requirement. The two-way channel of communication permits the
one-room test to be satisfied via a bridge of technology that ushers in the
visual component that was lacking in the cases where attestation was
attempted by telephone. Furthermore, the camera, if angled correctly,
permits the witnesses to see the testator sign and for the testator to see the
witnesses sign in a fashion that would not lead to the disputes over the
adequacy of the view in “through the window” 192 Thus, a close look at what
can be achieved with simultaneous two-way transmission of video and audio
has revealed that the ability of the testator and the witnesses to converse in
real time, while not physical presence, is communication every bit as
consonant with the purposes of the presence requirement as are standards
that extol and reward physical proximity.

C. Electronic Wills
The most interesting facet of remote-attestation orders as a response
to the pandemic is their interplay with electronic wills. Although it would
seem as if remote attestation might simply go hand in hand with electronic
wills as part of a concerted effort to digitize will execution, there has been
and remains ambivalence about pairing the two. The direction in which we
can expect the law to evolve is the subject of this section.
189

Ill. Exec. Order 2020-14 (Mar. 26, 2020).

190

In re Demaris’ Estate, 110 P.2d 571, 582 (Or. 1941).

191

Calkins v. Calkins, 75 N.E. 182, 183 (Ill. 1905).
Moore v. Glover, 163 P.2d 1003, 1006 (Okla. 1945).
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Executing pen-and-paper wills using remote execution and attestation
has been anything but comfortable and is the biggest challenge facing estate
planners and their clients. In the experiments with remote attestation
described above, remote attestation in the absence of electronic wills proved
cumbersome and nonintuitive. Moreover, it was observed that this method
of executing wills requires an internet connection, a computer or
smartphone, and a printer. These are tools that a significant number of
Americans lack, among them roughly a quarter of those aged sixty-five and
over. 193 No emergency remote-attestation measure acknowledged these
difficulties, however. Nonetheless, remote attestation has breathed new life
into electronic wills precisely because many associate online execution with
electronic wills and also because pairing remote attestation with electronic
wills would be a boon to estate planning. But until recently, at least in the
vast majority of jurisdictions, an electronic will could not be remotely
attested, and remote attestation could not be used to complete an electronic
will.
Before the pandemic, electronic-wills jurisdictions were of two minds
about pairing remote attestation with electronic wills. Arizona and Indiana,
for example, disfavored remote attestation altogether. 194 Nevada and Florida,
allowed remote attestation for electronic wills but not for pen-and-paper
wills. 195 The Uniform Laws Commission did not believe remote attestation
to be indispensable to a robust electronic-wills statutory scheme under the
UEWA and never included remote attestation in the Uniform Probate
Code. Early responses to the pandemic were consistent with this trend in
permitting remote attestation on an emergency basis but not providing for
electronic wills and in some cases expressly forbidding them to be the
product of a remotely attested will, 196 as if the amount of digitization might
Emily A. Vogels, Digital Divide Persists Even as Americans with Lower Incomes Make
in
Tech
Adoption,
PEW
RSCH.
CTR.
(June
21,
2021),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/06/22/digital-divide-persists-even-as-americanswith-lower-incomes-make-gains-in-tech-adoption/ [https://perma.cc/DYX2-W7D7]; Andrew
Perrin & Sandra Atske, 7% of Americans Don't Use the Internet. Who Are They?, PEW
RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 2, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/04/02/7-ofamericans-dont-use-the-internet-who-are-they/ [https://perma.cc/5K47-MQXY].
Dave Stafford, Probate Bar Proposes Legislation to Permit Electronic Signatures on Wills,
IND. LAWYER (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.theindianalawyer.com/articles/45116-probatebar-proposes-legislation-to-permit-electronic-signatures-on-wills [https://perma.cc/7KHTP5AB] (noting that the task force assigned to study electronic wills was not supportive of
remote attestation); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-2518(A)(3)(a); Pub. L. 40-2018 (Ind.) (requiring
“actual presence” for electronic wills and excluding “audiovisual telecommunication” from
its definition).
Compare FLA. STAT. § 732.502(1)(b)-(c) (requiring “presence” for attested non-electronic
wills) with FLA. STAT. § 732.522 (permitting remote attestation of electronic wills); compare
NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.040 (requiring “presence” for attested non-electronic wills) with NEV.
REV. STAT. § 133.088(1)(a)(2) (permitting remote attestation of electronic wills).
See Ill. Exec. Order 2020-14 (maintaining the prohibition of electronic signatures on wills,
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eventually reach an unacceptable degree.
States may now be poised to embrace, on a permanent basis, one or
both of these reforms. The tide is discernibly turning by degrees, as more
jurisdictions embark on the electronic-wills experiment and consider
whether to include remote attestation for electronic wills alone or for all
wills. Some states that already recognized electronic wills are extending
remote attestation to paper wills. For example, Indiana has added remote
attestation provisions to both its electronic wills and its paper wills statutes.
The electronic wills statute now requires only “presence” and recognizes
that “audiovisual technology” may be used “to satisfy the presence
requirement.” 197 Effective July 1, 2022, Indiana’s statute governing paper
wills defines presence as encompassing remote attestation and specifies that
a will executed “in two (2) or more original counterparts” must be
supervised by an attorney or a notary public. 198 Nevada, which previously
permitted remote attestation only of electronic wills, has extended remote
attestation to paper wills by adding a definition of presence that
encompasses “audio-video communication.” 199 Other states, considering
electronic wills for the first time, may or may not include provisions for
remote attestation. Illinois and Maryland have both enacted comprehensive
legislation permitting electronic wills and remote attestation for all wills. 200
Neither state used the UEWA as a legislative model.
Among the states that have enacted the UEWA, there appears to be
no agreement about whether remote attestation should be available for
electronic wills and, for those states that believe it should, no agreement
about whether remote attestation should also be extended to paper wills.
Utah and Colorado, for example, employed the UEWA as their model and
permit remote attestation of electronic wills but have separate statutes for
paper wills that make no mention of remote attestation. 201 North Dakota’s
version rejects remote attestation altogether, 202 while Washington’s version,
effective January 1, 2022, permits remote attestation for all wills. 203 States
considering enacting the UEWA are likewise not in agreement. Bills
introduced in Massachusetts and the District of Columbia reject remote
trusts, living wills and healthcare powers of attorney under section 5-105(c) of the Electronic
Commerce Security Act, since repealed).
IND. CODE § 29-1-21-4.
H.B. 1255, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2022).
NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.050(4) (2021).
755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 6/15-10(b) (permitting remote attestation for electronic or paper
wills); MD. CODE, ESTATES AND TRUSTS LAW § 4-102(b)(3)(ii), (c)(1).
Compare UTAH CODE § 75-2-1405(1)(c) (permitting remote attestation of electronic wills)
with UTAH CODE § 75-2-502(1)(c) (requiring witnessing of the testator’s signing or
acknowledgment of having signed); compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-1305(1)(c)(I)
(permitting remote attestation of electronic wills) with COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-502(1)(c)(I)
(requiring witnessing of the testator’s signing or acknowledgment of having signed).
N.D. CENT. CODE. § 30.1-37-04.
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.020.
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attestation altogether, 204 but the bill introduced in Georgia would allow it for
electronic wills. 205 Some legislative activity reflects none of these patterns, as
in Oregon’s new remote attestation provision that expressly excludes “[t]he
witnessing of the execution of a will.” 206 Similarly, bills introduced in New
York, harkening back to the emergency orders made at the outset of
pandemic, would not permit electronic wills but would allow remote
attestation for pen-and-paper wills. 207
In this flurry of legislative activity, the trend is toward permitting some
element of electronic technology into will executions, but the variety of
approaches portends that uniformity will be elusive for some time to come.
Perhaps the drafters of the UEWA were correct that under pre-pandemic
conditions legislators would not want to embrace both. Electronic wills had
been on the legal landscape—admittedly to a limited extent—for some time,
but remote attestation had not. Perhaps it made sense to market electronic
wills first to legislatures and then to build on whatever legislative territory
was thereby gained by introducing remote attestation at a later date. Such
planning is in keeping with an incremental strategy to aim for uniformity that
is unachievable all at once. The tireless work of the Uniform Laws
Commission and, to a lesser extent, of the American Law Institute in this
vein have yet to be influential in large measure because they are so recent.
There has not been adequate time for them to be reflected broadly in
legislative enactments.
Remote attestation and electronic wills may well exist comfortably
alongside each other at a future time yet to be determined. The pandemicinspired experiment with remote attestation has made it so that instead of
electronic wills setting the stage for the eventual acceptance of remote
witnessing, remote witnessing has set the stage for the eventual acceptance
of electronic wills. This has been an unexpected shift in course and one
from which there is no way back. The pandemic has shed new light on the
value of electronic wills, and we can all now easily envision a legal regime
where electronic wills and remote attestation exist side by side. There is
reason to believe that legislative activity going forward will eventually
confirm that remote attestation and electronic wills are two sides of the same
digitization coin and that the introduction of one into the statutes should
mean the introduction of the other.

SD.2927, 2021 Leg., 192 Gen. Court (Mass. 2022); B24-0450, 2021 Leg., 24 Council
(Wash. D.C. 2021).
H.B. 940, 2021 Leg., 442nd Sess. (Md. 2021).
OR. REV. STAT. § 42.141(7)(a).
S.B. 8071, 2021 Leg., 238th Sess. (N.Y. 2021); A.B. 6063, 2021 Leg., 238th Sess. (N.Y.
2021).
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CONCLUSION

The social distancing norms of the coronavirus crisis made the
execution of wills more difficult by placing beyond reach the traditional willexecution ceremony conducted indoors with the testator, the witnesses, and
the estate planning attorney seated around a table in a conference room.
With a Groffman-style dinner party also out of the question and with only a
handful of estate planning lawyers offering to make house calls or to meet
in a nearby park, testators eager to put their affairs in order have been
reduced to following an attorney’s or a do-it-yourself kit’s instructions as
faithfully as they can. Much can go wrong during such proceedings,
however, as the proponents of Groffman’s will learned. Online will
execution services are not the answer, as these services still require the
testator to print and scan paper documents and are in this sense not truly
“online.” Travel to jurisdictions that permit holographic wills is not always
possible and cross-border recognition of such wills not assured. An
individual faced with this poor set of options may conclude that postponing
estate planning is the most sensible choice.
The emergency orders permitting will-execution witnesses to attest the
testator’s signature by means of simultaneous audio-visual communication
have proven difficult to maneuver. They do nothing to relax the
requirement that wills be completed with pen and paper, and they raise
complicated questions of geographic specificity unfamiliar from prepandemic probate law. Practitioners and scholars interested in seeing a
wider and more flexible embrace of electronic wills than currently exists will
likely applaud the current widespread use of remote attestation.
Experiments reveal that those interacting in such a setting understand that
remote attestation cannot be viable long-term without also embracing
electronic wills. The use of remote attestation for the sole purpose of
executing pen-and-paper wills results in a cumbersome process that will at
least dissuade many from pursuing estate planning and at worst will lead to
irreparable mistakes in a legal system not wholly accepting of the substantial
compliance and harmless error doctrines.
This Article has described the current experiment with remote
attestation as one marked by hastily drawn executive orders that have raised
more questions than they have answered. At the same time, these orders,
although prompted by a crisis we hope will go away, present an opportunity
for ushering probate law into the digital age. As the British Law Commission
put it before it abandoned its 2017 project to modernize the Wills Act, any
move made toward the digital creation and execution of wills would “better
reflect the modern world.” 208 Making remote attestation and electronic wills
Wills, L. COMM’N (UK), https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/wills/
[https://perma.cc/YZ99-MP5Z].
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permanent features of our will-execution norms will not only serve this
important purpose but will help make estate planning more accessible and
egalitarian.
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